The European Union after the elections

The European Union after the elections

 

 

The European Union after the elections

Montréal

Centre d'excellence sur l'Union européenne

4.6.2014

 

Some of you may think or have been told of Europe as a lame duck, blemished by insufficient structures and cumbersome bureaucracies, a timid attitude towards research and new technologies (No genetics! No fracking!), and a lamentably slow and diffuse progress to take on global responsibilities. At the very time the Union is set out to solve the financial crises, to manage the risks of a civil war in Ukraine and Russian expansion, to reduce increasing unemployment in some Member states, to digest increasing immigration in Member-states both from inside and outside the Union, it shows to be an inconsumable blend of interests, institutions and ambitions, rich in paragraphs but poor in popularity. And paramount being unable to pass the democracy test.

  I.

When in 1979 I became a member of the first directly elected European Parliament it had the power to debate a lot of things but not to decide anything. When 30 years later, in 2009, I left the Parliament, it had got the power to decide on about 95 % of EU-legislation (in co-decision on equal footing with the Council of Ministers). And it had the power to elect the Chief of the Union's executive, the president of the Commission. (On a proposal by the European Council "taking into account the result of the European election") In only one generation of politicians the European Parliament passed from a purely consultative institution to a decisive one. Our national Parliaments took more than 100 years for the similar way.

 

Institutionally the Union got to go a considerable step forward to more democratic accountability - but how did it pass the election test? The European election of 25th May was the first under the increased competencies of the Parliament with both the full-fledged co-decision power and the election of the new Commission President.

To start with some political science remarks: Amending the Treaty in 2009 by the parliamentary election of the Commission's-President followed a triple intention: First: Personalization of the election to increase public interest by giving to the result of the election an impact on the choice of the Commission's Leader who got the competence to define the guidelines for its policy. Second: A broader parliamentary legitimation for the President of the commission and by such accepting "officially" the Commission's over years tacitly grown political role. Third: Readjusting the between Parliament, Council and Commission by leaving the European Council (Heads of States and Governments) involved in the election of the Commission's president by the competence to propose the candidate to the Parliament.

Has it worked? And will it work?  Political parties interpreted the new rules by presenting for the first time Europe-wide frontrunners of their electoral campaigns. And, yes, to a certain extent we saw some European wide campaigns. And some more people got the impression that the election was a real one. The presidential candidates crisscrossed the continent (not the UK!). They took part in TV debates, national and European. They won a significant amount of media coverage, steeply increasing media interest compared with previous EP elections. They talked seriously with voters about European issues. This was a European election (perhaps the first) where European policies were actually aired: Financial crisis and unemployment, Ukraine, immigration from outside and within the Union, centralization of powers in Brussels, National identity versus European integration.

But the personalization of the electoral campaign did not carry very far. The turnout increased about 5% in Germany (partly because the socialist frontrunner, Martin Schulz, was German) but decreased considerably in other countries, especially in Eastern Europe. The general turnout of about 43 % was only scarcely higher than in 2009 and far lower than the 62% in the first European election in 1979. Nor did the increase of Parliament's legislative powers stimulate the turnout. That is the real paradox of the Union's parliamentary democracy: Since 30 years Parliament's powers have been continually increased while the electoral turnouts decreased continually. That seems to be a more general problem of parliamentarian and representative democracy on all political level in Europe, local, regional and even national.

The result was a combination of shock and stability. Stability: The pro-European right wing parties [European Peoples Party/EPP, Liberals and Cameron's and allies, Conservatives and Reformists groups) lost ground, dropping from 55% to approximately 42% of seats in Parliament. The pro-European left wing parties (Socialists and Democrats /S&D, and Greens 7%) are treading water, standing around 32 % of seats. The EPP group while losing about 60 seats is stills the first with 213 seats (28% of the total, as opposed to 36% hitherto).  The S&D group with 190 seats is still second (25% like before). Reflecting the votes of an overwhelming majority of Europeans, the EPP and S&D groups are always going to account for over half of the seats in the European Parliament now and 2019, even if they will enjoy less of a dominant position than before (53% opposed to 61% in the2009-2014 period). Adding the Liberals and the Greens there is a clear pro-European Two-thirds-majority.

The shock: The Eurosceptic and Europhobic parties have gained ground garnering roughly 25% of seats - partly on the Left but more especially on the Right: The radical Left came first in Greece but added at the European level only a few seats to the post-communist Left. The Europhobic Right, mainly the French Front National and the British UKIP separatists increased together with the Five Stars Movement in Italy and some other but smaller strongly Eurosceptic and unaffiliated protest parties, the number of their seats considerably to more than 20 %. That is no longer to be called "marginal".

As there is no single party predominating nor even a right wing or left wing majority it is incumbent upon all Pro-Europeans to resort to coalitions forged on the initiative of the main groups. And as for a decisive influence on draft regulations and directives the absolute majority is requested Parliament will continue with a sort of a Great Coalition between EPP and S&D. Paradoxically the very success of the Europhobes makes it more likely that the two larger pro-European groups in Parliament will be forced to present to the Council the name of a common candidate who is likely to get the 376 votes necessary to be elected President of the Commission.

Juridically not binding but politically imperative for the Heads of State and Government is now to propose to the Parliament the campaign frontrunner of the PPE, Jean-Claude Juncker as candidate. If they tried to reach out for some other candidate Parliament will certainly not elect that one. After having told electors that they for the first time got to choose the next president of the Commission and ignoring their choice will recruit even more adherents to the Europhobic populists. That would be a political humiliation for the European Council and an institutional disaster. After the European election it is a "democratic must" that the new Parliament wins the first battle against the Council.

From a strictly institutional point of view, the Europhobic drive is likely to have a fairly limited impact on Parliament and legislation because of its inability to compromise, its internal divisions, and its lack of being interested in a constructive attitude towards Union issues. As they are focused on national victory they will try to discredit the Parliament by sabotage and by using it as a public stage for xenophobic and nationalist propaganda. Their influx will not be transformed into influence. So after all is there nothing new under the sun?

That is different on the national level. While fairly marginal in terms of seats (both in the European Parliament and in national parliaments) the Europhobic parties can (and will!) influence the order in which government parties address issues and formulate solutions - for example in the UK, France or Denmark etc. Europhobics like the Front National in France are not heeded by government parties when they call for quitting the Euro or the EU, nor when they voice with growing zeal their support for Putin - who is their newly discovered political hero. But they can (and will!) be heeded and influential, when, for instance, they claim internal and external migration being Europe's central problem and thus undermining one of the central achievements of the Union: The free movement of people.

 

While the UK has left the inner circle of leading countries in the EU by self-elimination since long, France now emerges from the 25th May vote with its image battered, tantamount to a battering for its influence in Europe too. Paris is going to be eyed - at least for some time - as the capital of a country that is not doing well at all: From the economic and social standpoint, in terms of its identity, or even from a political point the two major government parties account for only one third of votes (and for less than half of France's seats in the EP) while government parties in most other Member-states account for well over 50% of seats.

Is the Politicalization of the Commission by electing its president in Parliament favoring or hampering the democratization of the Union? In other words: Will it be the future "Government" of the EU? Only to a fairly limited degree, I think. Yes, the new president will enjoy a broader democratic legitimation of his own. And yes the influence of the Commission has been slightly increased in the intergovernmental framework of crisis-management. But on the other hand the composition of the Commission will continue to be politically polychromatic and multinational - a more or less true political picture of the different governmental majorities in the Member-states. And the main competences of the Commission rest unchanged.

There might be some room for institutional crisis in the future because of oversized personal ambition of the President or undersized awareness in the Council of the new balance between Parliament, Council and Commission. But I do not believe that this will be sufficient to fostering an institutional treaty-reform: In that reform the Commission could lose the sole right of legislative initiative; Market-control as well as financial decisions on subsidies could be transferred from the Commission onto an independent authority; and the number of commissioners (28) could finally be reduced. I do not believe that this will happen.

In spite of the parliamentary election of its president the Commission will continue to be only a nucleus of a government. And in spite of parliaments increased legislative powers but still co-deciding only on spending not on revenues it will continue lacking the power of the purse: Representation without taxation. The EU is not made to be a full-fledged parliamentarian democracy.

Where the new Parliament is heading to in the coming legislature? There will raise some major challenges to Democracy in the Union where Parliament is deeply involved by its co-decision powerSome examples: After the management of the financial crisis that has been mainly intergovernmental crisis-prevention will be a legislative challenge giving to Parliament a decisive say. On the CETA - as well as on the TTIP with USA that right or wrong is debated very controversial in Europe - Parliament will have the last say. To CETA I would advise both, Canada and the EU, to get it finished before public opinion in Europe will confuse CETA with TTIP. Big-Data will be an enormous challenge for European legislation in the years to come. Reducing Europe's dependence on international energy supplies by building up an Energy-Union along the Internal-market-rules will need regulations that will have a considerable impact also on Member-States energy policies.

A special word on the financial crisis and the future of the Union: The Union is close to the solution of the most severe and dangerous crisis in its 60 years history. It showed crisis-management and solidarity at a level that was simply not imagined 15 years ago with the introduction of the Euro. Its institutional system proved to be sufficiently stable and flexible. The common currency passed the severe stress test and resisted to worldwide speculation. Hundreds of professors in economics and finance confusing science and prophecy saw the Euro collapse in half a year or at best two years' time - the Euro zone did not split or dissolve. Some of the scientists remind me of experts of aerodynamics telling you that according to the laws of aerodynamics the bumble-bee is unable to fly.  And what is that beast doing? It flies!

 

II.

Are member states governed by Brussels? Frequently we hear, EU-legislation is if not dominating at least influencing about 80 % of national law making more or less directly. Do not believe that. The point is used by both Anti-Europeans as well as Pro-Europeans:  By the "Antis" in order to denounce the Union of centralization and undermining national sovereignty. By  the "Pros" to praise the Unions power and importance. Both are simply wrong. Serious research came to a very different result. The Europeanization of national laws is relatively high in some sectors such as agriculture, environment or financial services (above 60%) and very limited in others such as education, social protection, or security (less than 10%). In sum: the legislative impact of the EU is rather 20% than 80%, varying from 10% to 40 % according to countries. Important political sectors remain still purely in Member-states legislation without any stipulation from Brussels. A few examples only: Tax-raising, or public pensions-, unemployment-, and health-care systems are still and will remain strictly national. And think on Germany's getting out of nuclear energy was a purely national decision; the EU was not even consulted.

On the other hand there was a considerable increase of Union's ruling by intergovernmental decisions - mainly in the financial sector. The solution of the financial-market crisis was not achieved by Parliament or Commission - both playing a minor role - but by actions of the member-states (and the ECB). The Union became substantially deeper involved in national sovereignty reserves in form of arrogant troika controls, impertinent reform pressure, and humiliating comments from outside. The new status of "countries benefiting from aid programs" fuels the image of a Union governing its member states. Yet such a situation is limited both in time and space.

In the effort to ensure the stability of the common monetary area, where a supranational monetary policy exists side by side with budgetary and economic policies based on the nation state,  the recent reform of the European economic governance established a framework of intergovernmental action at the European level.  The fiscal discipline translates avoiding public deficits into an obligation to achieve by the member states. It is not imposing the means but the aim. The imperative necessity of closer coordination between Member states economic and social policies rests on political incentive - even when recommending is not the same as ordering.

Is that undermining what we can call a European democracy?  I do not think so. Why? Because of the dual democratic legitimation that is special with the Union. It is not lying alone with the European Parliament but also with the national governments and parliaments. That affords a special balance of power between Union and Member-states as well as between the Union's institutions. No legitimation - be it European or national - should prevail the other. No institution - be it Council, Commission or Parliament - should prevail the two other ones. That is complicated and confusing. And that will remain complicated and confusing because of some structural imperatives.

Only one example: In the EP  the citizens of smaller member-states must be inevitably overrepresented compared with the citizens of the bigger ones to an extent that one Maltese voter weighs as much as 13 German. That is why the EP cannot be and it should not aspire to be an alone deciding and an all deciding Parliament - as it is the case at least theoretically in European nation-states. National governments representing the national branch of democratic legitimation in the Union must remain involved decisively in European decisions.

In other words: The democratic legitimation of the European Union is based rather upon checks and balances than upon the "volonté générale" directly expressed by the people: Much more Montesquieu than Rousseau. Parliamentarian democracy instead of plebiscitarian democracy. Both community method and intergovernmentalism are columns of the European house. The guide line for democratic progress should be: Community method as far as possible, Intergovernmentalism as far as necessary.

The Union is said to show a substantial "democratic deficit". That is one of the main arguments used by both Antieuropeans to discredit the Union as well as by Proeuropeans set out to push for more democracy.  Both sides do not fully understand the very special character of the Union:  They call it a "deficit" when the Union's institutions, competences and procedures are not similar to their own national ones - fading out that the Union is a Union of States not a Federal State.

Yes, historically democracy is with the Nation-state - supposing that he was really able to decide autonomously on the main problems of his citizens. That is over. More and more countries are transferring decisions of an enormously far reaching economic, ecologic or social importance to international organizations. Not alone to the EU - far from that -  but also to those like IMF, WTO, World-bank, United Nations and G7, 8 or 20 - summits.

Among those international organizations the European Union is the only one with a directly elected parliament to represent citizens will and control of political power. It is the only one weighting the impact of a Member-State by the size of his population. It is the only one giving national parliaments a subsidiary say in common legislation and a decisive one on institutional reforms. The European Union does not show "a democratic deficit".  It shows to be the world's first and unique transnational democracy - still in the making ...

 

III.

The main problem of the Unions democracy is not institutional, even not structural - it is much and most the gap between Europe and the people. It is not the gap between democratic standards and democratic reality but the gap between truth and trust on the Union's level. The EU was previously associated with economic and social progress - particularly in periphery countries. The EU is not to blame for the current financial crisis but many of Europeans are worried about. An increasing number of voters do not trust the institutions in Brussels. They believe uniting Europe was a vision of peace and welfare and now associate Brussels with oversized bureaucracy. The truth is that vision without organization dilapidates into illusion.

They hold the Union for spreading opportunities to the world and reducing protection for ordinary people. The truth is that the EU - regardless of the many faults that are unavoidable in a Union based on the compromises between 28 Members and requiring unrelenting effort to correct them - protects people better than they will admit: They are protected from international competiveness by EU tariff and non-tariff barriers. They are protected by European consumer standards. The Taxpayer is protected by better monitoring European banks. And finally even the Euro has protected Member-states - from the fall out of their own mistakes.

And yet it is too easy to interpret the vote simply being a strong lesson to Brussels or to their national government. It is not really explaining the blight of xenophobic and populist demagogues getting a quarter of the vote. Not in all countries of course. But what is going on in Britain, the brand leader for parliamentary democracy, and in France, the modern era cradle of our liberties. Both are showing a diffuse feeling of national powerlessness, helplessness and impotence. They show a nationalism of fear not of pride, not of aggression but of regression. For those countries worst hit by the blight, this must be recognized what it is: A crisis of confidence in the national political class and the failure of democratic mainstream parties to find and to defend a clear and courageous position in favor of Europe.

Not in Spain for example, that has suffered as much as any in the European crisis. Not in Germany with its traumata of inflation and stable currency madness. And not in Eastern Europe where economic and social standards remain far behind Portugal or Greece. In Italy Matteo Renzi took a courageous position in favor of Europe and got under Italian conditions nearly unbelievable 41%. In Germany or in Poland all mainstream Leaders supported pro-European positions with a good result. Unlike the British and French political elites they got people to listen about their will to change Europe instead of destroying it.

In comparison: French and British parties and leaders did not resist to the temptation to make a scape-goat of the Union for all their national woes. All political leaders - conservatives as well as socialists - conducted politics with such lassitude that their leadership lost all credibility.  So media and the voters turned to the simplistic anti-European populism of Farange and LePen. The French socialists, actually the presidential party, got 14% in the European election. Especially France mainstream politicians did not resist the temptation to blame all of France's woes, especially economic, social and national status woes, on "Europe" - and on Germany.

In some Member-states there is a growing though diffuse feeling that being an EU-Member and National democracy are incompatible with each other. For those where that feeling becomes overwhelming the Lisbon Treaty opens a democratic door to leave. There is a new paragraph (Article 50) in the treaty: The right for any Member state to negotiate the exit. So if exit is peoples democratically expressed will let them go. The European Union is not a sort of Soviet Union.

Yes they can - but they will not do. The exit of any country will do a considerable damage to the Union but to a much higher degree to the exiting country. In the referendum to come in the UK on staying in or going out the majority of the people will vote in favor of staying in. British are difficult but they are not stupid ... For Italy I feel the same. So it is with Greece leaving; or Denmark; or Sweden. Anyway - the Union will survive those exits. The real problem could be with France. Unlike the exit of other countries the Union will not survive France's dumping the Euro and leaving the Union. But put to decide to be in or out French people will vote in favor of staying in.

If you now have got the Impression the European democracy is one without people, a provisional or interim solution doomed to failure, I feel the opposite will be to happen: There is the old French Say: "Rien ne dure que le provisoire". If that was right the Union's democracy is to have a long future.